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ABSTRACT

One in a series of working papers commissioned by the World Order Models Project, this essay suggests directions for thought and action relevant to the evolving struggle for a just world order. The first and most important need is to combine a struggle theory of history with traditional world order inquiry, visioning, and politics. We must blend the more traditional perspective of world order, which emphasizes formal global organization and the prevention of war, with the perspective of those who are engaged in the daily struggle against oppression. The second agenda item for discussion and action is demilitarization and alternative security. We need to create a strategy of inquiry which finds linkages among war, imperialism and local authoritarianism and identifies targets for political action which will dismantle the present system. A third cutting edge of world order thinking has to do with the notion of global culture and global civilization. The foundations of political and moral order must be reviewed during this transition period from Western-dominated nation state systems to a global community. The fourth agenda item stems from the notion of a global civilization: to think, feel, and act as a global citizen is essential to world order. A fifth agenda item is the local-global relationship. Just world order inquiry needs to engage in a more penetrating analysis of the term "local," including an assessment of preferred approaches to the local/global connection. Two final areas of inquiry which should receive a high priority are human governance and world authority.
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**The Struggle for a Just World Order:
An Agenda of Inquiry and Praxis for the 1980's**

SAUL H. MENDLOVITZ

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**WORLD ORDER MODELS PROJECT
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This paper is one in a series of working papers commissioned by the World Order Models Project in its effort to stimulate research, education, dialogue and political action aimed at contributing to a movement for a just world order. The WOMP paper series deals with the major global problems facing humanity today within an analytic and normative framework guided by the concepts and values of peace, economic well-being, social justice, and ecological balance. Like other work in WOMP, the series gives appropriate consideration to the necessity and feasibility of structural transformation of today's fragmented world for the resolution of these problems and the achievement of just world order results.

We invite interested individuals throughout the globe to respond to this and other papers in the series, either directly to the author or to the WOMP directors. Where appropriate, the responses and critiques will be published in *Alternatives: A Journal of World Policy*.

WORLD ORDER MODELS PROJECT

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THE STRUGGLE FOR A JUST WORLD ORDER: AN AGENDA OF INQUIRY AND PRAXIS FOR THE 1980's

Saul H. MENDLOVITZ*

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this essay is to suggest an agenda of inquiry and praxis relevant to the evolving struggle for a just world order. The concern here is not to develop a coherent theory of social change or to present a concrete program for a social movement, although both are needed. My aim is more modest. It is to suggest appropriate directions for thought and action that hopefully will help make research, education and political activism for a just world order more effective in the years ahead.

Because much of what I will say is informed by an intense involvement in the World Order Models Project, I want to acknowledge the importance of this involvement without putting the burden of any of these remarks on the Project or any particular individuals associated with it. It may be useful by way of introduction, therefore, to summarize very briefly the work of the Project over the past decade, pointing to the agreements as well as to what I consider to be significant disagreements that have been a source of creative tension within the Project itself.

The initial phase of the World Order Models Project was based on an agreement among participants to use a value framework (peace, economic well-being, social justice and ecological balance) to understand global political, social, economic and military processes. This agreement derived from the view that during a period of rapid social change the study of the breakdown of the old consensus and the emergence of a new consensus around a set of fundamental values was important to understand global political processes.¹ The value framework was not only a reflection of the group's normative leanings—although it certainly was that—but simultaneously it was the basis of a methodological attempt to come to grips with the globe as the

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appropriate unit of analysis. Recognizing that the existent value system represented a highly structured, hierarchical, some would say imperialist, nation-state system, our approach to transforming the system had to draw attention to values.

Along with the value framework we were very concerned to introduce a structural perspective into our work as a way of understanding how values were operationalized in the international system. While attentive to present structures, we nonetheless focused most of our energy on the futuristic and normative dimensions of global structures especially as they related to substantive issues of peace, economic well-being, social justice, ecological stability, and participation. There was a genuine agreement that this framework, used in an analytic as well as an ethical sense, was a sensible way for participants to understand their own notions of the world in relation to the emerging global community and polity.

Each research group or—as it frequently turned out—each individual author utilized this framework in producing a “soft” model of the future. Indeed, it may be more accurate to call the final products images rather than models for several reasons. First, they were not based on formal modeling theory; nor did they utilize the quantitative and mathematical techniques associated with other modeling exercises, such as *The Limits to Growth*, the Bariloche Model, and Wassily Leontief’s UN Study.² Second, the images went beyond straight-line projections of current data: whatever the empirical dimensions, the research demanded a statement of a *preferential* world in which world order values would be realized at some minimal level of decency. Thus, the WOMP exercise rejected the basic mainstream modeling premise of system continuity and assumed the possibility of system transformation, although each particular image had to meet criteria of feasibility. While statements of transition had to be grounded in reality, preferred worlds and transitions with low probabilities were accepted as targets for achievement. In my judgment, the participants were generally successful in translating the value-structure framework into a series of preferred worlds.³

Nevertheless, some serious disagreements concerning the operationalization of this approach did appear. Rajni Kothari’s comments in a recent Working Paper, *Towards a Just World*,⁴ capture some of these disagreements:

The rhetoric of world order is meant to further this approach to maintain the *status quo*. . . . The new language has sought to gain legitimacy from a radically different and far more idealistic school of thinking in the US which is committed to world order. The latter has been using an end to the nation-state system and, with it, the arms race, the utilization of world’s resources and technology for the fulfillment of basic needs of all human beings, the promotion of social justice and the generation of an ecologically balanced process of development—and global governance for undertaking these tasks. It is interesting to note how, in a period of imperial retreat, new legitimization is sought from dissident sources, how the paranoid strains in national culture

converge with idealistic strains in the same culture to produce an apparently new ideology in defense of old interests.

And again:

The projected model of globalism and 'world order' seeks to perpetuate international hegemonies, class exploitation within and between nations, and structures of governance that are repressive and inhumane. Such an order is designed to ward off movements from below of exploited classes, peoples and nations and the assertion of their rights, including the right of national sovereignty and 'collective self-reliance' by countries whose economies and policies are affected by an international structure of domination and exploitation. Without such a combative self-assertion by exploited nations, *tied closely to movements for structural change within nations*, globalism and world orderism will remain a recipe for management of the globe through an oligarchy of governing elites. We must reject such a diabolical conception of globalism.

As pointed out earlier in this paper, even the idealistic and extremely well-meaning proponents of globalism and world order have unwittingly contributed to such a conception. Their view of nationalism and assertion of state power as inherently inimical to the attainment of a just and peaceful world does not take enough cognizance either of the deep divisions and antagonisms that characterize the present world or the necessity of first dealing with them. Their enthusiastic support of the newfangled diversionary slogan of 'fulfillment of basic needs of the poor' and their near-contempt (unspoken, of course) for the political elites of the Third World have also served to legitimize a managerial and a political perspective on the world and its problems. We must reject both their analyses and prescriptions.

As one of the co-directors of WOMP, Rajni Kothari spent considerable time helping to develop the intellectual framework as well as the programmatic aspects of the Project. *Towards a Just World* represents his additional attempt to formulate a definitive rationale for the analytic and intellectual components of WOMP research and action. While in full agreement with most of the article, I did find Kothari's view of world order and globalism somewhat troubling.⁵

My disagreement with Kothari on world order and globalism illustrates the difference between agreeing on a fundamental value and structural framework and agreeing on details of reform, particularly the extent to which structural transformation of the state system is necessary and feasible. More specifically, Kothari argues that strengthening the state in the Third World is essential to overcoming the domination and hegemony of the North. While understanding this perspective and sharing Kothari's concerns about the need to avoid lending support to a managerial approach to world order that stems from the practitioners of statecraft in the Northern tier of the world, I nonetheless believe his position does not take into account sufficiently the extent to which the state system itself stands in the way of a more just world order. I am therefore much more circumspect than Kothari about reinforcing the state system even in the short run, and tend to stress the search for alternative political, social and cultural processes that embrace all of humanity.

In addition to our disagreement on the extent to which a "hard" nation state and the state system is needed (preferred, that is) in order to deal with

Northern hegemony and neo-imperialism, there is an additional question on which we have differences; namely, the viability of the nation state. I shall have occasion below to discuss what kind of change and transformation is taking place on the globe and whether or not the nation state can withstand the forces of interdependence and interpenetration. Suffice it to say here, Kothari tends to emphasize the viability, obduracy and obstinacy of the nation state while my own position is that there are economic, political, as well as social, cultural, and civilizational processes, including those of decentralization and subnationalism, which are undermining the viability of the nation state and of the entire state system as well. This leads to the further and perhaps ultimately more profound disagreement, namely, the extent to which global community is emerging. Kothari, with much justification, emphasizes the divisiveness of the peoples of the planet based on differences in power, wealth, culture, and historical circumstances. While recognizing this divisiveness and, indeed the contemporary heightened nationalism, aspiring secessionist movements, renewed religious identity, and a general searching out of roots, my own view is that the agents and bearers of cosmopolitan civilization as well as globalizing economic and political forces are becoming increasingly more significant, so that one must look seriously at the question of what kind of global community may be emerging.

At a minimum, then, there was and still is creative tension over the most appropriate way to express globalism in the promotion of a just world order, and at the same time be sensitive to Third World resentment at First and Second World dominance in intellectual/ideological as well as economic, political and military spheres. Any intellectual/ideational/ideological initiative that stems from the First, but increasingly the Second World as well, is viewed with suspicion. Kothari's suspicion, as expressed in this article, is restrained when compared with some of the conversations we had on these matters over the past five years.

One must also note the deliberate omission of the word "order" from Kothari's title *Towards a Just World*. Kothari is recognizing its cooptation by Kissinger and the Trilateralists, including Brzezinski, Carter, and perhaps Alexander Haig. For many Third World scholars, "order" connotes an inequitable system dominated by the North and maintained in many parts of the globe through regressive and oppressive measures.

In setting out the agenda I have tried to take into account this creative tension over world order and globalism. More specifically, I believe that emphasis on a *just* world order program of inquiry and praxis should be related to two overarching questions: Can we develop a world order perspective that will be genuinely responsive to the struggles of various oppressed groups throughout the globe? And secondly, what form of global polity is

likely to emerge over the final two decades of the twentieth century, and how can we shape it to operate, as Roy Preiswerk has so aptly put it, "as if people mattered."⁶ It is in the spirit, then, of responding to these questions as well as to the problems and opportunities at this moment in history that the following agenda is developed.

The agenda sets forth what I see as seven cutting edges of world order inquiry. It will be evident, however, that these seven areas are not analytically discrete, many of them overlap with one another, and some others may have been omitted. It should be noted also that the agenda is an attempt to reflect the concerns and anxieties of ordinary people as well as a world order view of what is an appropriate set of political projects. In this sense, it seeks to identify the intellectual and political circumstances of individuals throughout the globe who either are or might become involved in concrete programs of inquiry and praxis. The suggested agenda, thus, is less concerned with intellectual precision than it is with inviting various intellectual and activist groups to join the search for an appropriate world order agenda for the years ahead.

I. A struggle theory of history

In my view, the first and most important need is to combine a struggle theory of history with traditional world order inquiry, visioning and politics. We must blend the more traditional perspective of world order, which emphasizes formal global organization and the prevention of war, with the perspective of those who are engaged in the daily struggle against oppression. This should not be confused with the old debate over whether priority should be given to peace or justice, a debate largely resolved within the world order field by its more holistic and systemic approach. The question thus is not whether the struggle should embrace both peace and justice—because it necessarily does—but whether the struggle is informed by an appropriate vision of a just world order. It is to fill out what Marx left empty when he argued for the withering away of the state and the establishment of a global fraternity of socialist societies. The vision in this case acts both as a source of inspiration (motivation) and as a normative standard against which individual struggles must be judged.

Combining a theory of populist struggle with a vision of world order, it should be noted, also goes to the heart of the issue of transition and has a strong bearing on the type of world (just or unjust) that emerges. The question I wish to address initially is this: What and how can intellectuals contribute to the struggle of those who are oppressed? In approaching this question, I find it convenient to talk of voices, visions, and transition.

Voices. In order to insinuate a struggle theory into the dialogue and inter-

actions of those engaged in world order inquiry, it is essential to seek out the voices of the oppressed, articulate their messages, and give them expression within the context of world order inquiry. For example, speeches and writings of that leader-martyr against apartheid, Steve Biko, must become part of the movement for a just world order. The brutalized of Kampuchea and Idi Amin's Uganda, the thousands of courageous men and women tortured in Korea, the Philippines and Chile, the starving and degraded peasantry of Northeast Brazil and other areas of the world, the blacks in the South Bronx, Miami and other parts of the United States who are shut off from access to minimal material decencies in one of the richest societies in the world, the dissidents of Eastern Europe, and Mother Teresa's flock—people unable even to speak for themselves—must become the cornerstone of inquiry and action. Although we wish to establish a peace system, we nonetheless must consider the efforts and struggles of those who aspire to minimal material decencies and basic dignity. Their struggles, even when violent, may be a necessary part of the transition to a just world. As investigators, then, we must seek out these voices and express them within the context of world order inquiry.

In identifying the oppressed—those unable to speak for themselves and those struggling against an oppressive system on a day-to-day basis—we must recall that the present world system oppresses us all—witness our fear of nuclear holocaust, the possibility of nuclear radiation from civilian nuclear waste, the centralization of even so-called democratic regimes under the impact of energy shortages, and the alienation many citizens of wealthy societies experience. These all-too-familiar problems point to an increasing number of individuals and citizens of affluent industrial societies who are oppressed.

In addition, there is an oppression which alienates us from the potential of our own humanity. Anyone who has had the experience of visiting a poverty-stricken area of the world—India, or parts of drought-ridden Africa—will undoubtedly recall the difference between their first and perhaps their fifth or tenth visit. Our loss of human compassion is itself an oppression. For those who never achieved even that initial identity with the suffering of fellow humans, the loss is even greater.

Visions. We must state as clearly as possible the vision contained in the voices of the oppressed. Steve Biko, Kim Dae Jung, or Karen Silkwood's voices not only have to be introduced but expressed in such a manner that we understand their guidelines for inquiry and action. And here, I believe, we face a serious problem calling for integrity in reporting and the development of a hermeneutic sense that expresses forcefully and accurately the voices of the oppressed and that interprets them in such a way that they become useful in promoting the struggle for a just world order.

At present, the visions contained in these voices arise from "local circumstances." This is understandable. The existential positions in which these individuals find themselves are such that their concern is struggle against a particular tyranny or brutal authoritarian regime, such as Pinochet's, Marcos's or Chun's. While some individuals in these struggles identify with broader movements, such as Marxism, Third World solidarity, or Islam, their immediate target in the main is the overthrow of a particular structure close at hand. It is difficult for them to express a globalist, let alone a world order, perspective within these struggles, even though people like Biko or Kim Dae Jung articulate a vision for all human beings which has the potential for contribution to a just world order. In the absence of a broader vision of the human enterprise it is not clear that their energies can help appreciably to change the present global system of domination and exploitation. Yet, like all of us, they are caught in the world system: their efforts to become full participants in that system, to bring about a change in their own domestic and local conditions, to provide a polity for the members of their own society which is democratic and equitable, and their wish to become sovereign nation states in fact as well as symbolically are expressions of universal yearnings in this era of history.

The problem is that in capturing their own polity they become full participants in the nation state system, and it is precisely in becoming actors in this system that they may be paradoxically enough working against a just world order. There are good reasons to believe that the nation state system itself is an obstacle to that goal. At a minimum, it is evident the militarism that is sweeping the globe is the result in part of this anachronistic system. National leaders, in order to maintain power internally as well as to protect their society from external aggression, generally feel compelled to rely upon military force, thus reinforcing one of the most demonic aspects of the present world order.

Moreover, it is not certain that local and national movements can ever succeed on their own terms without a broader vision. The present world order conditions to a large extent what is possible in any local context. We are all constrained by larger economic, military and political forces. We know, for example, that movements for national liberation frequently succeed temporarily only to be destroyed or compromised by hostile international political forces (e.g., Allende's Chile, Poland, Nicaragua) or on the other hand by the lack of accountability to universal standards of decency (Iran). It may have been his understanding of this problem that recently led Abolhassan Bani-Sadr to reflect that "his deepest most abiding concern is with the prospects for revolution on a global scale."

I realize that the above series of propositions is controversial. Nevertheless,

I wish to point to a serious problem that introducing a struggle theory of history into world order inquiry raises. Once we have identified the individuals or groups involved in local struggles, we will need ways of interpreting their visions to transcend those local circumstances without compromising the integrity of the particular struggle and vision.

Transition. Transition is a very broad and complex subject and is an agenda item in its own right. Within the context of this discussion of the struggle theory of history I should like to raise just two questions. First, with respect to people fighting oppression and struggling against local tyrannies, to what extent do these local struggles conjoin and become synergistic for global transformation? Is it sensible, let alone feasible, to ask of Biko or Kim Dae Jung to take on the role of agent for both local and global transformation? Some political leaders—Fidel Castro, for example, in his role as head of the non-aligned states—do present this transformational view of the local circumstance thrown up against the global political and economic system. Yet, whatever the merits of their leadership, it does not seem to inspire genuine concern for global transformation on the part of large numbers of people. Another example, perhaps more related to individuals carrying on “local struggles” within the context of global transformation, is Martin Luther King, who, in addition to assuming leadership in the civil rights movement, also played a prominent role in the anti-Vietnam War movement. As one reads his speeches and writings against the Vietnam War, the tragedy of his death becomes even greater, for he clearly grasped the notion of a just world order and understood the manner in which an activist, nonviolent political process might help bring it about. Yet, on a practical level, we recognize the importance of considering the existential circumstances in which people live. Obviously, a South African black fully engaged in fighting apartheid in his own society ought not to be expected to do anything about starvation in the Sahel, while a West German, Japanese or United States middle class citizen has the opportunity and capacity, and therefore the duty, to be involved in both these problems as well as in others, such as demilitarization of the globe. These questions, however, are thorny and require further exploration.

Second, to the extent that there is a tradition of struggle against oppression embedded in some of the great religions—Buddhism, Jainism, Christianity—we can ask whether universalistic solidarity themes can be reinvigorated by spiritual movements.⁸ It seems sensible to consider that by confronting the oppressive structure faced by individuals throughout the world, these movements transcend local struggles and supply the missing thematic unity necessary to inspire a global transition process.

To summarize, the extent to which individuals and groups caught in “local circumstances” are also able to involve themselves in concrete political

projects transcending state boundaries is a subject that needs much more attention by those concerned with just world order inquiry and action.

II. Demilitarization and alternative security

The second item on the agenda refers to the more familiar subject of demilitarization. By militarism I mean that system which is based on coercive and oppressive force and which consists of three intertwined subsystems: war, imperialism and local authoritarianism. Whatever the origins of these three systems, they are inextricably interwoven at this moment in history: they reinforce one another, color all interactions among polities, and indeed represent one of the most significant facets of contemporary global culture.

It is not necessary to detail the extent of the war system operative in the world today. The \$600 billion that will be spent this year, the heightened arms race between the superpowers, the mini arms races in the Third World, the transfer of sophisticated weaponry from the industrialized to the non-industrialized world, the growing capacity of small and medium-sized states to produce their own weaponry, the armed intervention of the superpowers in various states of the world (not least of which is the continuing Soviet aggression in Afghanistan), and the tragedy of socialist states (e.g., Vietnam and Kampuchea, the People's Republic of China and Vietnam) and Third World states (e.g., Iraq and Iran, Somalia and Ethiopia) using armed force against one another, are all indicators of the vitality of the war system.

Traditional world order investigation of these matters focused on conflict resolution devices such as third party mediation, peacekeeping operations, or at least monitoring, and moved from there to possibilities for disarmament rather than mere arms control. These concerns should continue, but the view that militarism is made up of the three subsystems noted above suggests that the manifestations of militarism may be more subtle than prior emphases admit. For example, the execution of Steve Biko and the imprisonment of Kim Dae Jung represent extensions of militaristic thinking into the domain of local governance. Therefore, attempts to deal with these subsystems as separate and distinct, rather than as parts of a total pattern of militarism, fail to comprehend the scope of the problem. We need to create a strategy of inquiry and praxis which finds linkages in these three subsystems and identifies targets for political action which will not merely reform the present system but dismantle it. In arguing that the three systems are interlinked, the hope is that intellectuals and political activists throughout the world will see themselves as part of a common enterprise to demilitarize the globe.

Within this context, the issue of state sovereignty, will undoubtedly be raised. Whether one refers to an Idi Amin, a Pol Pot, a Gulag Archipelago, or to the

treatment of political dissidents anywhere in the world, the question arises as to the appropriate way for the global community to intervene in these matters. The monitoring of brutalization, torture or apartheid is not a function which should be performed solely by Amnesty International or other states bent on "embarrassing" the perpetrator, as helpful as they have been. There should also be some mechanism of actual intervention available to the world community to rectify situations in which imperialism, coercive force and war are present.

One of the most alarming developments is the growing momentum toward the unthinkable. The recent shift in U.S. strategic doctrine toward a nuclear war fighting capability, the decision to go ahead with the MX missile, the planned placement of Cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe, and the almost blind militaristic attitude of the Reagan administration at a time of perceived and real scarcity of resources in the industrialized world—all of which have certainly their reaction if not their counterpart in the Soviet Union—have increased dramatically the risks of a major war, indeed have brought us close to a war that would destroy human civilization as we now know it. I would therefore make the prevention of World War III a very high priority for all citizens in nuclear weapons states, but especially for those in the United States and the Soviet Union. The movement to prevent World War III might also serve as a rallying point for the complete denuclearization of the world. Such a radical position is now being embraced by such distinguished figures as George Kennan and is developing an impressive following in Europe and the United States. Efforts by members of the medical profession (Physicians for Social Responsibility) to stress the horrendous consequences of nuclear war and by members of the legal profession (e.g., Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy) as well as other groups to delegitimize and make criminal the possession, manufacture as well as the threat and use of nuclear weapons, are giving additional impetus to such a movement.⁹

The elimination of nuclear weapons, however, also calls for a fundamental rethinking of prevailing conceptions of security. As long as states see military power as essential for security and as a legitimate instrument for pursuing national interests, they are unlikely to give up nuclear weapons, no matter how widespread the movement becomes. Even if nuclear arms are given up temporarily, they are likely to reappear quickly in times of crisis unless the present system is greatly refashioned.

Our concern with demilitarization and denuclearization thus is closely tied to the need to redefine security as something other than a national interest notion. Security should refer to human security, and individuals within their own societies should assume the responsibility for activist campaigns against their own military establishments and for joining transnational movements

aimed at dismantling the three subsystems. It should be noted that the WOMP Demilitarization Working Group is now embarking on a new project exploring *peoples security* and its implications for demilitarization.

III. Emergence of global civilization

A third cutting edge of world order thinking has to do with the notion of global culture and global civilization. Recognizing the possibilities of Armageddon or an Orwellian world, it nonetheless seems very likely that when earthlings circa 2100 review human history, they will consider the century between 1950 and 2050 as that incredible time when global community emerged. The transition to global community from a Western-dominated nation state system will undoubtedly seem as profound as the transformation some 7500 years ago when humankind moved from hunting and collecting bands into agriculturally fixed units, a period during which the state arose. We now live, as it were, in an interpenetrative era: communications have made the planet a territorial and civilizational reality for us all.

*The historical experience of global reality.*¹⁰ Of the half-billion human beings who lived on the face of the globe in 1500, few knew the globe was round. Apart from the fact that they were all mortal, it would be hard to argue that they shared a common fate or destiny, let alone a common existence. Looking ahead to the year 2000, there will be twelve times as many people, and it will be extraordinary if most do not know that the planet is round, that human beings are spread throughout the globe, and that, despite the divisiveness created by differing nationality, ideology, race, class, sex, religion and age, all share a common existence and destiny.

Of course, it is true that many individuals throughout the globe still do not move more than a few hundred miles from their place of birth. Many individuals have very little information or knowledge about the rest of the globe, and those who do hold onto—in fact, promote—"local identities" and exhibit little feeling for human solidarity. And there is intensified nationalism and even subnationalism throughout the planet. Nevertheless, it is also true that the globe has become part of the experiential world in which most human beings live, that clothing, food, lifestyle and even belief systems are now directly and indirectly impacted by global processes, and that most individuals are aware of some such impact.

The intellectual/political tradition. There have been intellectuals and political activists in the 19th and the 20th centuries who have considered the entire human enterprise as a unit of inquiry and action. Marx and Hegel come to mind immediately. In this century, Spengler, Toynbee, Chardin, and Kenneth

Boulding are some of the outstanding thinkers who have concerned themselves with this phenomenon. More importantly, the leading political figures of the early decades of the 20th century, Lenin and Wilson, not only thought globally but acted accordingly. Nevertheless, it seems fair to say that there has been a serious lack of concern about global civilization among academicians. Macro-histories, incorporating a behavioral anthropology of the entire human community, have been the concern of neither anthropologists, sociologists, comparative political scientists, nor those involved in the investigation of international relations. This oversight is partially explained by what has been pointed to earlier as the very abstract nature of the concepts of global civilization, culture, and community. These concepts extend beyond the experiential reality of most human beings. They are concerned with a form of culture in an aesthetic and spiritual sense, and do not come to grips with issues of power, wealth, and prestige, let alone family, friendship, fellowship, love and hate for the vast majority of humanity. Further, the political myth underlying the state system emphasizes territorially separate identities which reinforces insularity and subspeciation.

Whatever the strength of this political myth, it is now clear that something akin to global civilization and culture is perceived and accepted by growing numbers of individuals throughout the globe. Increasingly, people recognize the extraordinary, drastic and profound transformation which is taking place in all societies. Certainly, if society, as John Dewey put it, exists in and through communication, global human society is emerging and community is not far behind.

As alluded to above, a dominant culture, Western in origin and industrial in nature, has permeated the globe. This culture is facing problems of legitimacy and validity both at home and in the penetrated societies. Since a just world order inquiry is a project of normative reform, we should be exploring the cultural changes necessary to minimize violence, to insure minimum standards of social justice, economic development, ecological balance, and to guarantee adequate participatory processes. If we are to engage in this enterprise properly, a major effort must be made to discover what the oppressed, the dominated and the underrepresented in world political processes have to say about these questions as well as the extent to which they find the basic categories of analysis appropriate. In doing so, we will undoubtedly want to go beyond Western notions and discover what Eastern and so-called Southern societies have to say about this terminology and its appropriateness for the enterprise. To be more specific, we must make certain that our inquiry does not overlook the possibility that concepts and experiences of the dominant culture have swamped traditions and culture not holding center stage in the communication and information flow of the

globe. This is not merely a matter of ethical preference; it is a political judgment that unless we look at the deep strands of myth, civilization and culture throughout the globe, we will not be able to achieve sufficient consensus to create a just world order.

All of this suggests a willingness to review the foundations of political and moral order. I would venture to predict that in the next five years there will be significant increases in studies of macrohistory and psychohistory, macro-political economy, and macrosociology. Basic terms such as "community," "society," "culture," "civilization," "polity," "economy" and "government" will come under very close scrutiny and be reevaluated for their conceptual, ideological, psychological and spiritual implications. For example, for 60 years we have known of an alternative to private property and to capitalist political economy; that is, for some 60 years the Soviet Union and other polities have existed without private property as it exists in Western society. Of course, this challenge to the validity of the ownership, possession and use of private property goes back to Marx, and the empirical basis for equity and participation goes back to so-called primitive and traditional societies.

Simultaneously, and just as significantly, the drive for equity has undermined traditional categories of hierarchy: race, class, sex are no longer morally, and in many cases legally, valid ways of determining status or worth. What are the appropriate categories for classifying individuals for the purpose of adequate representation in decisions which affect their lives and the distribution of the material goods in society? What is the appropriate authority, and what structure of authority should we have in society? As world order thinking works its way through cultural and civilizational studies, it will be necessary to identify and to attempt to *synthesize* definitions of authority in various societies and ascertain the substantive areas which seem significant and important to individuals and to global society.

Finally, the growing influence of ecology as an area of social science, research and intellectual thought needs to be mentioned. The appreciation of the earth as a delicately balanced ecosystem has reinforced the notion of the wholeness of the human family. At the same time, it has raised additional critical questions related to economic development, equity, and public authority. The ecology question, for example, is now central to most discussions of political economy. Whatever the methodological deficiencies of the limits-to-growth exercise, no matter how strong the drive for more material growth, or for Third World sovereignty (including permanent ownership of natural resources), we must now face up to the fact that the globe's biosphere has limited resources. As we move from 4 billion people to 6.2 billion people, questions of rights of ownership, possession, use, disposition, and inheritance of resources are likely to become central to individuals and to global polity.¹¹

IV. Global citizenship

The fourth new element stems from the notion of global civilization but is more properly understood as a methodological matter. My proposition is this: *to think, feel and act as a global citizen is essential to world order inquiry and praxis*. The attempt to assume the perspective and posture of a global citizen is offered not as a political matter—at least in the ordinary sense of the term “political”—to achieve world order reform, although this may ultimately be implicated. Rather, it flows from the understanding that global civilization is emerging and that global citizenship is a prerequisite for investigating, predicting, and exerting control over social and political processes. *The operational thrust of this proposition is to develop a global-interest perspective which will ultimately compete with, replace or combine in some new way with national-interest theory.*

Traditional theory of international relations, as expressed by Morgenthau, assumed that world political processes could be understood and predicted by observing the way national elites managed foreign policy to maximize national interest. It was clear that certain practitioners of national-interest theory were more adept than others, and that a level of domestic politics had to be taken into account. But, as a heuristic device for understanding the diplomatic, political, economic and military activities of the globe, national-interest theory provided the prism for understanding.

Recent attempts to explore the manner in which various domestic interest groups interact to forge foreign policy, the introduction of interdependence notions, the view that transnational organizations, especially corporations, place limitations on national interest—all are part of the attack on the validity of that theory. Yet, at a time when nationalism and national interest are at a height, these approaches do not address the fundamental deficiency of the older paradigm; namely, its failure to explain the incapacity of nation states to deal with global problems. While it is true that this incapacity does not necessarily suggest rational system change, there is a sense in which it provides openings for a more appropriate global perspective. It is in this sense that we must explore more fully the limitations of national-interest theory. This must be done in a more forthright and bold manner through the adoption of a significantly new investigative posture: namely, that of global citizenship.

We have obviously overstated the denotative and perhaps even the connotative aspects of the term “citizenship.” Our intent was to point up the fact that the emerging global community is searching for polity. As we examine global problems, we generate a new set of data which require modifications in our thinking about solutions and about international relations theory in general. In effect, we are participating in the creation of a new political

mythology. The global modeling of the Club of Rome, the Bariloche model and the work of Leontief, whatever their deficiencies, illustrate the attempts of social scientists to create this new political myth around human society and the globe.¹² Robert Johansen's seminal work in analyzing U.S. foreign policy, using a global humanist framework, is another.¹³ It would be sensible to explore the impact of this methodological innovation, and how it can be further expanded in social science research.

V. The local-global relationship

In asking that world order thinkers assume the methodological posture of thinking, feeling and acting as a global citizen, we must take account of things "local." It is important to take this up as a separate point because, apart from its intrinsic merit as an area of inquiry, there is need for deeper analysis of issues and dilemmas involved in this whole parameter. Currently, many scholars and social activists are working on this issue in terms of maximizing self-reliance—the disassociation or decentralization of small territorially organized social units from a more central system. Others simply find it a more congenial starting point than globalism. My argument is that just world order inquiry needs to engage in a more penetrating analysis of the term "local," including an assessment of preferred approaches to the local/global connection.

One important question concerns the extent to which the term "local" is grounded in territoriality. From the viewpoint of international relations, world affairs and global politics, the nation state is synonymous with local, in the sense that it provides a polity with juridically agreed-upon boundaries of territory. National elites, of course, operate comfortably in the larger world arena, but their primary purpose is to secure power and wealth for the nation state, their local.

The validity of this notion of the state as "local," however, is under attack from a number of directions. Robert Johansen's pioneering work, noted above, on the global human interest is illustrative of the world order attack on the state as a local. Johansen's work rests on the assumption—"that the human race is the important constituency to consider in policy making." According to Johansen, the world's people as a whole, not just those of a particular state or class, should benefit from policy decisions.¹⁴ The state as local is also being questioned by a group of scholars in the United States under the intellectual leadership of Chadwick Alger at the Mershon Center of Ohio State University. He and his colleagues are attempting to prepare a new map of the globe showing connections between cities like Columbus, Ohio; Scranton, Pennsylvania; Kyoto, Japan—not as they relate to the globe

through Washington, D.C. or Tokyo, but as they relate directly to other areas of the world. This particular effort has had both an intellectual and social activist impact in the United States but has not yet spread to other areas of the globe. However, the approach opens a perspective which seeks to discover the manner in which particular social organizations are local unto themselves and yet have relationships directed to the rest of the globe.

Finally, the validity of the nation state as "local" is also challenged by notions of "small is beautiful," self-reliance, devolution and decentralization. Unfortunately, these organizational concepts have become matters of principle rather than means to desirable ends. The drive to develop self-reliant communities has many laudable features. At the same time, we should be cognizant of the danger Marx spoke of as "rural idiocy," and even more important, the possibility that local establishments can become tyrannical. Accordingly, I believe the "small is beautiful" ethic must include accountability to universal standards. There must be sensitivity to processes in which the unit is cohesive unto itself or more or less autonomous with regard to decision making, yet provides opportunities for review, appeal and even intervention by an authority applying universal standards. For instance, in the absence of a U.S. Federal Government, the process of desegregation, or legalization and protection of labor union activity in a prior era, might have been more violent, or it might not have occurred. It should be made clear that we are not seeking centralization over decentralization or vice versa, but rather are trying to achieve humane values for all individuals and collectivities. In short, we should not "over-principalize" either extreme of governance. We must ascertain the blend and balance of the two for any particular circumstances in terms of human needs.

We return now to the question posed at the beginning of this section; namely, is territoriality the only basis for things local? To what extent are religion, race, language, sex, culture, and civilization potential bases for a "local" which is as significant as territoriality? In asking the question this way, we raise another—what comprises the identity of our social selves? It would be useful to rid ourselves of the view that global identity should be either the overarching or foundational platform for our social selves. We need to find ways to explore, articulate and interpret global identities which intertwine with the identities associated with a certain prefect in the city of Tokyo, the state of Japan, Asia, the non-aligned group, the Trilateral world, and the like.

It would be important to know the cadre of individuals throughout the globe who have some such global identity. Is this cadre diminishing or growing? What are the conditions under which diminution and growth take place? Is it possible to have a genuine identity with the entire human race along with the identities we have with other significant primary, secondary, and present nation state identities? Let me underscore again that it is not a matter of dis-

carding one's identity as a national citizen of any polity. It is a question of how global identity interacts with the framework of whatever one defines as local identity.

It might be useful to look ahead a century and ask: will territorial discrimination be to the 21st and 22nd centuries what racial discrimination was in the 19th and 20th centuries? Are we coming to a point where the territory of the planet should be open to all? Will mobility throughout the globe become a right? What are the implications of these ideas for what most people see as the overwhelming crush of population movements to the affluent industrialized world? Is there a less disruptive resolution of that form of mobility, in more equitable distribution of the goods and services of the globe?

As a matter of praxis, I am taken by the slogan, "Think globally, act locally." Native Americans, the East Timorese, the Kampuchean, are caught in local circumstances which require their full effort and action locally. And to the extent they carry on their struggles with a view to the principles of global humanism, the local-global interaction provides a significant basis for "humane governance."

VI. Humane governance

Another cutting edge of world order inquiry is subsumed in this term "humane governance." World order inquiry must deal with governance but, unlike earlier attempts to do so, our concern must focus not only on global governance but on the extent to which all individuals and social units have the opportunity to attain minimal standards of decency both in material and spiritual terms. Previously, world order inquiry centered around the elaboration of various models of world government, such as *World Peace Through World Law* by Grenville Clark and Louis Sohn.¹⁵ While some of those models, particularly the one developed at the University of Chicago under the leadership of Robert Hutchins and Luis Borgese,¹⁶ incorporated concerns for material and social justice, and for relationships of local or regional units to the central authority in terms of these issues, it is fair to say that constitutional and institutional features of government held sway.

One implication of a struggle theory of history, however, is that just world order inquiry must encompass much broader notions, and it is in that sense that the concept of humane governance should be developed. One useful approach along this line is that developed by my WOMP colleague Richard Falk, who treats humane governance as an overarching human right essential for the realization of other basic rights.¹⁷ More specifically, Falk defines humane governance as "the right of individuals and groups to live in society and a world that realizes" (1) basic human needs, (2) basic decencies,

(3) security and (4) participatory rights. He argues that "humane governance is a kind of world order imperative" that implies an inability to achieve other human rights "without transforming the political order that now exists."¹⁸ Viewed in this way, humane governance has the potential for linking local struggles and just world order at the so-called global level.

VII. World authority

We have made the argument for humane governance for various units of social organization and noted the way in which those units might interact to meet the needs of human beings. We have also dealt at some length with the question of local/global nexus. Furthermore, in introducing a struggle theory of history into world order inquiry, we have been reminded very forcefully of the extent to which local circumstances dictate concrete political goals. I nevertheless would argue that world authority as an area of inquiry for the promotion of a just world order should receive a high priority. There are several reasons for this position.

To prevent catastrophe: This is the argument that without centralized peace-keeping and third party resolution of disputes thermonuclear war and destruction of human society are likely. This argument needs further elucidation, but the destruction resulting from such a catastrophe would be so enormous that it is incumbent on responsible individuals to at least explore whether world authority provides a real possibility for preventing such an outcome.

A host of people have written on this subject. The Harvard-MIT group, some two years ago, predicted the use of nuclear weapons as a certainty before the end of this century, albeit catastrophe was not envisaged. In a paper called "Working Hypotheses for the Establishment of a World Authority," presented at the Lisbon meeting of the World Order Models Project (July 1980), Silviu Brucan, distinguished scholar and former diplomat from Romania, argued that without world authority the catastrophe would take place. *Pacem in Terris* by Pope John XXIII also makes this prediction:

As a result of the far-reaching changes which have taken place in the relations within the human community, the universal common good gives rise to problems that are very grave, complex and extremely urgent, especially as regards security and world peace. On the other hand, the public authorities of the individual nations — being placed as they are on a footing of equality one with the other — no matter how much they multiply their meetings or sharpen their wits in efforts to draw up new juridical instruments, they are no longer capable of facing the task of finding an adequate solution to the problems mentioned above. And this is not due to a lack of good will or of a spirit of enterprise, but because their authority lacks suitable force.

The argument of complexity: Catastrophe from nuclear weapons or ecosystem collapse aside, there is an argument that the state system is in-

capable of dealing with the cybernetic era in which we live. The 6.2 billion human beings alive at the end of this century will need some form of centralization which transcends the state system. Again, it is significant that this problem is alluded to by Silviu Brucan, the first major scholar in the Eastern bloc to look favorably upon the notion of world authority. And it is all the more significant, given traditional Eastern European socialist attacks on *mondalism*, one world, and world law as bourgeois attempts to run the world. That Professor Brucan makes the proposal indicates that we may be talking about an idea whose time is coming.

The argument of inevitability: Let me state this argument by quoting from a prominent neo-Marxist theoretician, Immanuel Wallerstein:

Socialism involves the creation of a new kind of *world-system*, neither a redistributive world-empire nor a capitalist world-economy but a socialist world-government. I don't see this projection as being in the least utopian but I also don't feel its institution is imminent. It will be the outcome of a long struggle in forms that may be familiar and perhaps in very few forms, that will take place in all the areas of the world economy (Mao's continual "class struggle"). Governments may be in the hands of persons, groups or movements sympathetic to this transformation but *states* as such are neither progressive nor reactionary. It is movements and forces that deserve such evaluative judgments.¹⁹

One may say, as Hedley Bull does,²⁰ that world authority is impossible to achieve, unnecessary, and likely to be worse than the system we have. It is my belief that Bull is wrong on all three counts and that Wallerstein, Brucan, and Pope John XXIII must be taken quite seriously. Certainly, the managers of interdependence, whether they were of the Pentagonal world of Nixon and Kissinger, or the Trilateralist persuasion of Jimmy Carter, were increasingly conscious of the necessity for a global concert to avoid the disintegration of the world environment and economic system, the catastrophic use of nuclear weapons, as well as the passage of power from their own hands. (The Reagan administration's present more unilateral posture, in my view, is a temporary phenomenon and will be replaced, perhaps even in this administration but certainly in the next, by a more global concert strategy.)

It is in part because of this interest on the part of the national security managers to promote a concert of the globe that I believe centralization of power in the 21st century is likely to be oligarchic and oppressive, unless it is counteracted by concerned individuals and groups sincerely interested in the global human interest. I therefore make a plea to intellectuals and social activists, who generally harbor disdain for this area, to participate in defining and promoting the structures of governance needed to promote a just world order at the global level as well as at the local level.

Epilogue

It is clear that the many and varied struggles taking place against oppres-

sion in all regions of the globe are perhaps the only viable foundation for a global movement for a just world order. This is one of the clearest lessons to be drawn from the world order studies effort to date. Yet we have also learned that local struggles are greatly constrained by an overarching global structure of militarism, an oppressive structure that we have described here as the intertwining of imperialism, war, and local tyranny. The people's victories in Vietnam, Iran, and Poland, that have become tragedies to varying degrees testify to the limits of national revolutionary struggle in a militarized nation state system. We are very much in need, then, of a clear and coherent global vision which will provide normative and policy guidance for "local" struggles so that they might ensure their own success as well as become an integral part of the larger struggle for a just world order. It is for these reasons that I have argued in this paper for combining a struggle theory of history with traditional world order visioning and politics. Such an epistemological and political framework, it is hoped, will provoke new thinking among scholars and political activists about their participation in the critical world order struggles for humane governance of the 1980s.

Notes

1. Some Marxists may quarrel with an analytic framework that focuses upon value consensus. Admittedly, this framework may not sufficiently take into account several key Marxist precepts: particularly the views that class conflict is the primary dynamic of history and that societal stability is based on the ruling class' control of the means of production. Nonetheless, I believe that Marxist theory does comprehend the importance of an agreed-upon set of values among a significant sector of society, without which class dominance could not work. It is in this sense that the term "consensus" is being used.
2. See, e.g., Donella Meadows, et. al., *The Limits to Growth* (New York: Signet, 1972); Amílcar Herrera, et al., *Catastrophe or New Society? A Latin American World Model* (Ottawa, Canada: International Development Research Council, 1976); Wassily Leontief, et al., *The Future of the World Economy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977). There are major differences among these models in terms of the assumptions they make about equity, growth, and economic development. The Bariloche study, *Catastrophe or New Society*, is the most compatible with world order inquiry, given its emphasis on basic needs and equity for the Third World.
3. The output of this effort is a series of book-length monographs under the general title "Preferred Worlds for the 1990's." Chronologically they are: Rajni Kothari, *Footsteps into the Future* (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1974, and New York: Free Press, 1975); Saul Mendlovitz (Ed.), *On the Creation of a Just World Order* (New York: Free Press, 1975); Richard A. Falk, *A Study of Future Worlds* (New York: Free Press, 1975); Ali A. Mazrui, *A World Federation of Cultures* (New York: Free Press, 1977); Gustavo Lagos and Horacio H. Godoy, *The Revolution of Being* (New York: Free Press, 1977); and Johan Galtung, *The True Worlds* (New York: Free Press, 1980).
4. Rajni Kothari, *Towards a Just World*, WOMP Working Paper Number 11, reprinted from *Alternatives*, V, 1, 1979, pp. 1-42. The first quotation is from p. 9 and the second from p. 23.
5. A distinction needs to be made here between globalism and world order. Globalism refers to a perspective or framework through which economic, social, and political processes are viewed,

and goes especially to the geographical scope of these processes. World order is more encompassing, and is concerned with the actual social and political organization of the planet. World order thus refers to the general framework of power and authority that exists at any particular time and the extent to which this framework realizes a set of values—peace, economic well-being, social justice, and ecological balance—for all of humanity. Mainstream definitions of world order are in some ways remarkably similar, yet are also different in critical respects. Hedley Bull, for example, refers to world order “as those patterns or dispositions of human activity that sustain the elementary or primary goals of social life among mankind as a whole.” I have three basic disagreements with Bull. First, I cannot accept his stress on order as the primary world order goal and, in this connection, believe he underestimates the extent to which justice is a necessary condition for the achievement of order. Secondly, I believe his analysis that the nation-state is likely to endure indefinitely ignores the significant global and local forces that are eroding the nation-state. Finally, I also disagree with Bull’s view that the nation-state in any case is preferable to other alternatives. Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 20.

6. Roy Preiswerk, “Could We Study International Relations As If People Mattered,” essay prepared for the 50th Anniversary of the Institut Universitaire des Hautes Etudes Internationales, Geneva, Switzerland, in 1977; reprinted in *Peace and World Order Studies: A Curriculum Guide* (New York: Institute for World Order, 1981).

7. See Richard Falk, “Excerpts from an Interview with Abolhassan Banisadr,” *Alternatives*, 8, 1, 1982.

8. One must also acknowledge the criticisms of organized religions that have been made in a world order context. These criticisms are basically of two types. The first emphasizes the particularistic, parochial, and reactionary character of some religions, and points to those qualities that are not compatible with the realities of a more universal order. The criticism of Islam’s treatment of women, for example, falls in this category. The second group of criticisms focuses on those universalistic, evangelical religions, such as Christianity, that are “innately” aggressive, intolerant, and destructive of other cultures and societies. Whatever the merits of these criticisms—and I am making no judgment here nor am I capable of doing so—the concern is to emphasize those themes of struggle and species identity embedded in certain religions that can be appealed to in mobilizing a movement for a just world order.

9. For arguments along this line, see The Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, *Statement on the Illegality of Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, 1982); *Disarmament for a Just World: Declaration of Principles, Proposal for a Treaty, and Call for Action* (Statement issued on the occasion of the International Workshop on Disarmament, organized by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies with financial assistance from the Government of India, 27-31 March, 1978, New Delhi), *Alternatives IV*, 1, 1978, pp. 155-160; and *Denuclearization for a Just World: The Failure of Non-Proliferation* (Statement prepared at meeting of the World Order Models Project in Lisbon, July 1980) *Alternatives VI*, 3, 1980, pp. 491-496.

10. We start here with an obviously Eurocentric view of history and it may well be that one of the tasks of just world order inquiry which involves global culture will be to fix new symbolic dates to tell this story.

11. The ecological problem, especially as it relates to questions of property, might be considered another cutting edge of world order inquiry.

12. See note 2.

13. Robert Johansen, *The National Interest and the Human Interest: An Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980). Johansen describes

his global humanist framework in the following way: "First, the value framework proposed here rests upon the assumption that the human race is the important constituency to consider in policymaking. The world's people should benefit from policy decisions. The traditional approach gives priority to the people of one nation. It also provides more benefits for the governmental elite and its supporters within the nation than for the national population in general. Thus my proposed emphasis on the human interest differs in two ways from traditional diplomacy. First, the scope of human identity extends across national boundaries rather than remains confined to the people within them. Second, human identity expresses bonds of community between those at the top and at the bottom of the class structure. Compared to the traditional foreign policy approach, human community is expanded horizontally to include all nations and vertically to encompass all classes.

A second idea that undergirds the proposed value framework is that the service of human needs should be the guiding principle for major economic and political decisions, rather than the maximization of national power or corporate profit. This does not mean that nationhood or profit are excluded, but only that they should rank lower in the hierarchy of values than service to basic human needs. A corollary of this value orientation is that human transactions based on cooperation and a sense of human solidarity would increase, while transactions that are competitive and based on a denial of community would decrease. Competitiveness among large social groups is less useful when the human race is the subject of concern than when only a national group is the focal point for protection, production, and consumption. If fulfilling human needs is to become the guiding principle for policymaking, then those most in need should be the first to receive attention. A politics of liberation, which the fourfold value framework is designed to advance, is like the practice of medicine at its best: to help first those people who are most in need. It differs sharply from theories of politics that call for triage, the lifeboat ethic, or the trickle-down theory of development.

Third, the *entire* planet, the atmosphere around it, and the high seas are of prime concern. They are to be protected and conserved for both present and unborn generations. In contrast, the exponents of the national interest place the exercise of sovereignty over one *part* of the planet's territory at the top of their hierarchy of values. They are concerned with securing advantages for "their" segment of the planet and of the human race, and they pay little attention to the needs of future generations.

The four preferred world order values and the three clarifying principles provide the value framework that I call *global humanism* in the course of this analysis. The *human interest* is the collection of goals and strategies that are consistent with and will advance the values of global humanism. The term *humane world community* is used to mean a universal human identity or all-inclusive sense of human solidarity combined with social norms and institutions that aim at achieving a life of dignity for all through an equitable sharing of decision-making powers, opportunities, and resources. *Global populism* refers both to (1) the emphasis on a citizens' movement to mobilize and empower the poor and politically weak and (2) the introduction of structural reforms inspired by the preferred values and designed to help the dispossessed." *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

15. Grenville Clark and Louis Sohn, *World Peace Through World Law*, 3rd rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966).

16. Preliminary draft of a World Constitution, University of Chicago, 1948.

17. Richard Falk, "Comparative Protection of Human Rights in Capitalist and Socialist Countries," *Universal Human Rights*, 1, April-June, 1979, pp. 3-29.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

19. Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis," *Comparative Studies on Society and History*, 16, September 1974, pp. 387-415, quote taken from p. 415.

20. Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).

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PEACE.ECONOMIC WELL BEING.SOCIAL JUSTICE.ECOLOGICAL BALANCE
\$2.00